Wheat price programs: effects and implications for Ohio by McCormick, Francis B. & Smith, Mervin G.
RESEARCH BULLETIN 866 OCTOBER 1960 
Wheat Price Programs: 
EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR OHIO 
FRANCIS B. McCORMICK and MERVIN G. SMITH 
Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station 
Wooster, Ohio 
CONTENTS 
Conclusions 3 
Past Government Price Programs----------------------------- 5 
Economics of Pnce Support Programs---------------------- 6 
Federal Farm Board, 1929 ------------------------------ 7 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 ---------------------- 7 
Sod Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 8 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and Amendments-------- 9 
Agricultural Act of 1949 -------------------------------- 12 
Agricultural Act, 1956, 'Soil Bank"----------------------- 12 
Wheat Supply and Utilization Trends-------------------------- 13 
Soft Red Winter Wheat Production _______ - ________ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 16 
Effect of Government Wheat Pnce Programs (6 & 7!--------------- 18 
Effect on Production ----------------------------------- 19 
Compliance With Acreage Allotments--------------------- 20 
Effect On Total Production of Non-Compliance by Farmers With 
Allotments of Less Than 15 Acres--------------------- 21 
Effect of Pnce Supports and Production Controls on Wheat Pnce_ _ 22 
Extent of Farmer Participation in Non-Recourse Loan and Pur-
chase Agreement Programs-------------------------- 23 
Effect of Government Programs on Farm Income------------- 25 
Type of Program Preferred------------------------------ 26 
Characteristics of Soft Red Winter Wheat----------------------- 29 
Demand for All Classes of Wheat and for Soft Red Winter Wheat for 
Human Consumption------------------------------ 31 
Per Capita Consumption of All Wheat Flour Products---------- 32 
Per Capita Consumption of Soft Red Winter Wheat Products _ _ _ _ 34 
Total Consumption of Soft Red Winter Wheat and All Wheat ___ 35 
Bibliography _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 38 
W H E A T P R I C E P R 0 G RAMS: 
EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR OHIO 
FRANCIS B. McCORMICK and MERVIN G. SMITH 
CONCLUSIONS 
Significant conclusions are summarized as follows: 
800 
871 
1. Federal Government price support and production control 
programs have limited wheat production in Ohio. 
2. The legislative provision which permits farmers with allotments 
of fifteen acres or less to grow this many acre& without penalty limits 
effective production control. 
3. Many farmers do not understand objectives of Government 
price support and production control programs. 
4. Farmers value freedom to make production decisions more 
than they value high incomes. 
5. Total and per capita demand for soft red winter wheat is 
increasing and is likely to continue to increase while the same factors for 
all wheats are declining and will likely continue. 
6. Soft red winter wheat production is declining relative to total 
U. S. wheat production. 
7. If the Federal Government is to continue supporting wheat 
prices consideration needs to be given to varying the program for the 
soft red type. 
Wheat production in Ohio has been limited by the program as was 
shown by the fact that 59 percent of the farmers surveyed indicated they 
would increase acreage the following year even if they knew the result-
ing price would be as much as 10 percent less with a larger acreage. In 
central and western Ohio, the important wheat producing area of the 
state, three-fourths of those interviewed indicated they would increase 
acreage. Approximately one-third of those planned to increase acreage 
from 30 to 60 percent. Some authorities believe that reduced acreages 
are associated with improved management practices, the end result of 
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which is less reduction in production than indicated by acreage reduc-
tion. Although there perhaps may be some truth in this thought, the 
survey did not substantiate it. 
The provision in the law which permits farmers having allotments 
of 15 acres or less of wheat to grow up to 15 acres without penalty, 
limits effective total production control. Sixty-eight percent of the 
farmers interviewed had one or more allotments of less than 15 acres. 
A total of 58 percent of this group overplanted their allotment. 
Although there was also some underplanting of allotments, the over-
planting exceeded underplanting by an amount equal to 4 percent of the 
total wheat acreage in the sample. Some believe this to be a small and 
unimportant figure but when it is associated with a commodity with an 
inelastic demand (such as wheat), the price consequences may be quite 
substantial. If effective production control is a desired objective, con-
sideration needs to be given to tightening this provision in the legislation. 
Many farmers do not understand objectives of price support and 
production control programs. Many apparently are unaware of the 
fact that the demand for wheat is inela<;tic and that one method to 
increase income is to re5trict overall production and supply. Some seem 
to believe there is some ulterior motive on the part of the Government in 
promoting production control programs. This indicates a need for a 
:.trong educational program to accompany future price support and pro-
duction control programs. 
Farmers value freedom to make production decisions more than 
they value high incomes. When a:.ked what type of Government pro-
gram they preferred, a majority indicated a preference for "no govern-
ment program, price determined by supply and demand." When 
questioned further about how low wheat prices could fall before they 
would accept marketing quotas, approximately two-thirds of this group 
indicated they would be unwilling to accept them at any level. 
Both total and per capita demand for soft red winter wheat is 
increasing and is likely to continue to increase while both total and per 
capita demand for all wheatR i-; declining and will likely continue to 
decline. Per capita consumption of all wheat flour declined from 155 
pounds in 1942 to 127 pounds in 1955. Projecting this trend indicates 
a figure of 105 pounds in 1965. If we assume a minimum rate of 
population growth, total consumption of all wheat will likely decline 
approximately 36 million bu1.hels to a total of about 459 million by 
1965. If on the other hand, a maximum rate of population growth is 
assumed, total consumption will likely decline approximately 18 million 
bushels. The picture for soft red winter wheat is quite different. Even 
if a minimum rate of population growth is assumed, total consumption 
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of this type of wheat will increase about 34 million bushels during the 
ten year period. If a maximum rate of population growth i5 assumed, 
the increase from 1955 will be about 40 million bushels making a total 
of 136 million bushels. 
Soft red winter wheat production is declining relatively in the U. S. 
During the decade of the1930's, production of this type wheat accounted 
for approximately 25 percent of total wheat production. During the 
first half of the decade of the 1950's, it accounted for less than 18 per-
cent of total production. 
If the Federal Government is to continue supporting wheat prices, 
consideration needs to be given to varying the program for the soft red 
type. A program designed to restrict production of a product for 
which the demand is declining does not seem to be entirely suitable for 
a product for which the demand is apparently increasing. One sug-
ge:,tion which might be worthy of consideration is a program encom-
pa:,sing less restrictive acreage restrictions in the soft red winter wheat 
area. This and the other conclusions are based on the assumption that 
further study indicates findings in this study are essentially correct. 
They are also based on the assumptions that the degree to which other 
wheats may be substituted for soft red will not change greatly and that 
geographic areas of production will remain relatively con:-.tant. Present 
technology permits only limited substitution in usage. 
PAST GOVERNMENT PRICE PROGRAMS (1) 
Ohio farmers and farmers throughout the United States have been 
participating in various Federal Government farm price programs in 
recent years. Actually the government began to come into the farm 
picture in an important way during World War I. At that time two 
farm commodities, wheat and hogs, were supported at minimum prices. 
The objective then was to encourage farmers to increase production to 
"help win the war and win the peace." 
During the depression years of the 1930's, Government activity in 
agriculture increased. In this period, however, the objective was not to 
encourage production but to limit production as a means of stabilizing 
and raising farm prices. 
World War II was a period in which government activity in agricul-
ture continued to increase and the policy objective reverted to the one 
in effect during World War I, namely increasing production to win the 
war and win the peace. During the war, United States farmers greatly 
increased production of almost all commodities including wheat. After 
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the war, this increased production was the incentive for government pro-
grams to again revert to a policy designed to stabilize and raise farm 
prices by means of production adjmtmcnt. Basically this same policy 
is in effect today. 
ECON,OMICS OF PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS 
Price !>upport programs including the wheat program have been 
centered around the idea that if farmers limit production and the 
government guarantees minimum prices, total income to farmers will be 
greater than if there is unlimited production and no price guarantees. 
From an economic viewpoint, this idea is logical because the demand for 
wheat is considered to be relatively inelastic. An inelastic demand 
means that when supply is increased or decreased a certain percentage, 
the resulting percentage price change will be greater than the percent-
age change in supply (most believe the elasticity of demand for wheat is 
approximately 0.2 although this figure would vary for individual 
classes). Assuming the above figure is correct, it indicates that for 
each one percent change in the supply of wheat, the price of wheat will 
change 5 percent in the opposite direction in a given demand situation. 
As an example of inelasticity, when the supply of wheat in the 
United States is one billion bushels and the price to farmers is $1.80 per 
bushel the resulting total gross income to wheat producers is 1.8 billion 
dollars. For purposes of analysis, assume the supply of wheat changes 
to 1.1 billion bushels. This represents a 10 percent change in supply. 
The resulting price change would then be 50 percent ( 5 X 10) or a 
price of $ .90 per bushel. A price of $ .90 per bushel and a supply of 
1.1 billion bushels would result in a total gross income to wheat pro-
ducers of 990 million dollars ( 1.1 billion bushel times $ . 90 per bushel) . 
This represents 810 million fewer dollars for United States wheat pro-
ducers associated with a 10 percent increase in supply. 
The preceding figures are hypothetical and they assume both a 
constant demand for wheat and the elasticity to be the same at all price 
levels. Although they arc hypothetical they should not be considered 
exorbitant. They typify one important reason why there is a farm price 
and income problem. The fact that the demand for most farm 
products, and especially wheat, is inelastic represents the economic logic 
back of all government price support programs designed to raise farm 
prices and income by means of production controls. Specific programs 
are briefly described below. 
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FEDERAL FARM BOARD, 1929 
The Federal Farm Board was established under provisions of the 
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 and the board was given 500 
million dollars with which to work. The act provided that the board 
enter the price support field by guaranteeing minimum prices for certain 
farm commodities including wheat. Purpose of these activities was to 
stabilize and perhaps raise wheat prices through storage programs. The 
thought was that wheat could be purchased on the open market and 
stored, thus reducing the supply of wheat and as a result raising the 
price. At some later date, :;,tored wheat could be sold on the open 
market. 
To wheat farmers, activities of the Federal Farm Board represented 
a minimum guaranteed price for their wheat, and as a result they 
responded in a rational manner and increased their production of wheat. 
This action on the part of United States wheat farmers soon resulted in 
a loss of most of the 500 million dollars. Hindsight tells us that the 
economic lesson to be learned from Federal Farm Board activities is that 
some attempt should have been made to control production if prices 
were to be guaranteed at a minimum level. When production is not 
controlled, farmers increase production to take advantage of the guar-
anteed price, thus making the price support program costly to the 
government. 
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1933 
This act was the first major piece of farm legislation passed during 
the early days of the "New Deal" program. Legislators, having learned 
a lesson from Federal Farm Board activities, the Act of 1933, provided 
for having the Federal Government pay farmers to limit production of 
certain animals and crops including wheat. Methods used for limiting 
production were rather crude and, specifically in the case of wheat, they 
involved plowing it under. Thus, the idea again was to limit pro-
duction and thereby increase prices and income to wheat producers. 
This was to be accomplished in two ways. The direct payment from 
the Government for plowing under the wheat would raise income to the 
farmer in the amount of the payment. Also, since wheat production 
(theoretically at least) would be limited because of acreage plowed 
under, the supply would be decreased and as a result wheat prices would 
increase. Payments to farmers were made from money collected 
through a processing tax which was levied against the first handlers of 
wheat. The government had not yet started dipping into the Federal 
Treasury to get money with which to pay farmers for controlling pro-
duction. 
7 
The parity price idea was discussed in this statute but no specific 
statement was made regarding the exact level at which wheat price:. 
should be supported. Instead the act stated that farmers should gen-
erally be guaranteed prices which were "fair and just" in relation to a 
base period. The base period included August, 1909 to July, 1914. 
This act, commonly known as the AAA of 1933, was in effect until 
January, 1936. At this time, the Supreme Court declared the act to be 
unconstitutional because it said this legislation represented an attempt 
to control farm production. The Court indicated that since the Con-
stitution did not specifically provide for the Federal Government to 
control agricultural production, this power, by implication, remained in 
the hands of the various state governments. 
SOIL CONSERVATION AND DOMESTIC ALLOTMENT 
ACT OF 1936 
This act was passed in February, 1936, only one month after the 
AAA of 1933 had been declared uncontitutional by the Supreme Court. 
Its stated purpose was "to promote the conservation and profitable usc 
of agricultural land resources by temporary Federal aid to farmers and 
by providing for a permanent policy of Federa1 aid to states for such 
purposes." Actually, this act provided for paying farmers to shift land 
from soil depleting to soil conserving practices. It was only incidental 
that the soil depleting crops were those which were also in surplus at the 
time. Most authorities agree that the intended purpose of this act was 
no different than the intended purpose of the Act of 1933. It was 
necessary, however, to change methods because of the Supreme Court 
decision. 
The difference in method concerned the fact that farmers under 
this act were paid to reduce acreages of those crops which were in sur-
plus and increase acreages of soil conserving crops (wheat, being a soil 
depleting crop was included). This technique raised individual farm 
income in the amount of the payment. Indirectly, this adjustment also 
reduced acreages of land u~>ed for crops in surplus and as a result, at 
least theoretically, should have had a price increasing effect for these 
particular crops. Thus, the intent of this act was apparently the same 
as the act mentioned above, namely to increase farm prices and farm 
income. 
Under provisions of this Act the processing tax was discontinued 
and the Federal Treasury was used for the first time as a source of funds 
for :.upporting farm prices. 
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AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1938 
AND AMENDMENTS 
Many of the provisions of this act are still in effect and for this rea-
son it is one of the more important pieces of farm legislation which has 
been passed during the past half-century. Among other things, it pro-
vided that wheat prices be supported at specific percentages of parity. 
For example, wheat prices were supported at 52 to 57 percent of parity 
in 1938-40, 85 percent in 1941-43, 90 percent in 1944-54, 82.5 percent 
in 1955, 82.6 percent in 1956-57, 75 percent in 1958 and 76 percent in 
1959. Support has been chiefly through Government Non-Recourse 
Commodity Loans to producers and purchase agreements. 
The Commodity Credit Corporation, to carry out the price-support 
operations, was created by an executive order of the President in 1933. 
It was made a part of U.S.D.A. in 1939. 
The AAA of 1938 provided for controlling production of wheat by 
acreage allotments and marketing quotas. Each of these is described 
below. 
Acreage Allotments-A National Wheat Acreage Allotment is pro-
claimed each year by the Secretary of Agriculture. The formula for 
arriving at the number of acres to be produced takes into account supply 
of and expected demand for wheat. At the present time, legislation 
prohibits an allotment of less than 55 million acres for the United States. 
When the National Allotment is established it is divided among the 
states on the basis of acreages produced during the previous 10 year 
period. Likewise state allotments are divided among the counties on 
the basis of production during the previous 10 years. At the county 
level, the county allotment is divided among wheat farmers in the 
county on the basis of production and other considerations during the 
previous three year period. Producers who stay within their alloted 
acreages are eligible for price support loans. 
Marketing Quotas-Quotas are proclaimed only if the total indicated 
supply of wheat exceeds estimated normal requirements by 20 percent 
or more. They become effective only if two-thirds or more of the wheat 
producers vote in favor of quotas in a National Referendum called by 
the Secretary of Agriculture. In the commercial wheat areas, a 
farmer's marketing quota is the normal or actual production on alloted 
acres, which ever is larger. 
Farmers who grow 15 acres or less of wheat are partially exempt 
from marketing quota provisions. Those who stay within their alloted 
acreage are given Marketing Certificates which permit them to market 
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their entire crop of wheat. Producers who harvest in excess of their 
allotment (and who harvest more than 15 acres) are required either to 
pay a penalty equal to 45 percent of parity on all excess wheat or to 
store it under seal. (Thirty acres are the limit if it is all fed.) 
Marketing quotas have been proclaimed and voted for the crop 
years, 1941 to 1943 and 1954 to 1960. Quotas for the 1942 and 1943 
crops were terminated because of the war emergencies and farmers were 
permitted to market all excess wheat without penalty. 
Commodity Credit Corporation-As indicated previously, the Com-
modity Credit Corporation was created by executive order of the 
President in 1933 and became an official part of the United States 
Department of Agriculture in 1939. It is the price supporting agency 
of the U. S. Government. It carries out its price support operations by 
one or both of the following methods. They are Non-recourse Loans, 
and Purchase Agreements. 
Non-recourse Loans: This is a loan made by the Commodity 
Credit Corporation to a farmer in the amount of the support price per 
bushel multiplied by the number of bushelR of wheat produced on his 
acreage allotment. The farmer has the privilege of repaying his loan 
with a nominal amount of interest by a certain date. He is also per-
mitted to sell his wheat on the open market if the open market price is 
higher than the government support price. A loan of this type also 
gives him the privilege of permitting the government to acquire title to 
the wheat if the loan price of wheat is higher than the open market price. 
The word "non-recourse" means that the government cannot hold the 
farmer responsible for any difference between the support price and a 
lower price in the open market and that the government has no recourse 
but to take over ownership of wheat at the support price. 
Purchase Agreements: A purchase agreement is an agreement 
between the Commodity Credit Corporation and a farmer in which the 
CCC agrees to purchase a stated quantity of wheat at the guaranteed 
price at some future date. This method of supporting prices is used less 
extensively than the method mentioned above. It is, however, used by 
some farmers who for one reason or another are unable to obtain 
acceptable storage facilities or by those farmers who do not have an 
immediate need for cash for their wheat and do not wish to be obligated 
to pay interest as would be required by acceptance of a non-recourse 
loan. Also, it is used occasionally by farmers who prefer to postpone 
their income tax payment from one year to the next. 
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TABLE 1.-Support Prices of Wheat, Quantity Pledged for Loan, Controls 
in Effect, and Exports under International Wheat Agreement and 
Commodity Credit Corporation Act, United States, 1938-58 
Support Price CCC Wheat Exported 
Year Under IWA and 
begin- Sea- Percent- Pledged Controls in Effect Actt 
ning son age for 
July 1 aver- of loan* Acreag•e Market- Subsidy 
age parity allot- ing Quantity per 
ment quo~a bushel 
Dollars Percent Mil. Mil. Mil. Cents 
bushels acres bushels 
1938 0.59 52 86 62.5 No 93 28.2 
1939 .63 56 168 !:>5 No 36 29.0 
1940 .64 57 278 62 No 22 20.5 
1941 .98 85 366 62 Yes 20 21.6 
1942 1.14 85 408 55 Yes:j: 20 33.2 
1943 1.23 90 130 55:j: Ye4 2 60.4 
1944 1.35 90 180 § No 19 28.8 
1945 1.38 90 60 § No 67 5.6 
1946 1.49 90 22 § No 
1947 1.84 90 31 § No 
1948 2.00 90 366 § No 
1949 1.95 90 381 § No 141 55.1 
1950 1.99 90 197 72.8 No 266 67.0 
1951 2.18 90 213 72.8§ No 255 65.5 
1952 2.20 90 460 § No 242 55.5 
1953 2.21 90 557 § No 180 47.1 
1954 2.24 90 431 62.8 Yes 199 79.5 
1955 2.08 82.5 321 55.8 Yes 130 73.7 
1956 2.00 82.6 253 Sf> Yes 123 87.0 
1957 2.00 82.6 256 55 Yes 128 
1958 1.82 75 609 55 Yes 129 
1959 1.81 76 55 Yes 
1960 1.77jj 75 Yes 
*Includes loans made directly by CCC, loans made by banks and other lending agencies 
under CCC obligations to purchase, and wheat put under purchase agreement during the crop 
ye'ar. Excludes renewals and extensions of loans on wheat from other crop years. 
tlncludes exports under the International Wheat Agreement Act s1nce 1949 and Com-
modity Credit Corporation Act but does not include wheat exported under special financial 
arrangements and government aid programs. 
:!:Marketing quotas and acreage allotments were terminated because of emergencies 
after the winter wheat was planted. 
§Secretary of Agriculture, under emergency powers, did not proclaim allotments. 
!!Preliminary. 
I 
Source: U. S. Agr. Marketing Service. The Wheat Situation, U. S. Prod. and Mktg. 
Admin. CCC Price Support Statistical Handbook, 
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AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 1949 
This Act provided for a system of specific flexible price supports. 
Such a system implies that the support level is decreased as the supply 
of wheat increases and the support level is increased as the supply of 
wheat decreases. This act provided for the following schedule of sup-
port prices ( 2) . 
Support Level Supply as a Percentage of Normal 
(% of parity) Over Not over 
90 102 
89 102 104 
88 104 106 
87 106 108 
86 108 110 
85 110 112 
84 112 114 
83 114 116 
82 116 118 
81 118 120 
80 120 122 
79 122 124 
78 124 126 
77 126 128 
76 128 130 
75 130 
The above schedule of support prices is designed to di~courage 
wheat production as the total supply of wheat in the U. S. becomes 
larger. Contrariwise, it is intended to encourage production of wheat 
as the supply become~ smaller. This assumes price to be a regulator of 
production in that it encourages farmers to produce more at high prices 
than at low prices. Of course, it may be that even these lower support 
prices are high enough above the free price that production is encour-
aged and not discouraged. 
AGRICULTURAL ACT, 1956, "SOIL BANK" 
This Act consisted of two parts, the Acreage Reserve and the Con-
servation Reserve. The Acreage Reserve provided for producers to 
enter into formal contracts with the Government in which the farmer 
agreed to reduce the acreage of wheat by a specified amount. Farmers 
also agreed not to use the land for any other crop. In return for such 
agreements, the government reimbursed the farmer for taking land out 
of production. The rate of payment averaged slightly more than $20 
per acre. In some respects, provisions of this act were similar to those 
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provided by the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. 
Under provisions of the 1936 Act, the land taken out of wheat pro-
duction could be used for producing other crops. Under provisions of 
the Soil Bank Act, it is necessary to take land completely out of pro-
duction. 
The Conservation Reserve Program of the Soil Bank in its original 
form was designed to reduce production on non-allotment crops. Inas-
much as wheat doesn't fall in this category, it was not included in the 
Conservation Reserve of 1956 and 1957. Some changes were made in 
this program in 1958, and beginning in 1959, acreages formerly used for 
wheat may be placed in the Conservation Reserve. Rate of payment 
per acre beginning in 1959 is somewhat higher than rates paid in pre-
vious years. 
WHEAT SUPPLY AND UTILIZATION TRENDS 
The total supply of wheat in the U. S. has been increasing in recent 
years. Total supply is defined as production, plus carryover from one 
year to the next, plus imports. During the past 15 years, total pro-
duction has exceeded one billion bushels in most of the years, and in 
those when it did not exceed this figure, it was in excess of 900 million 
bushels. Carryover from one year to the next has also been increasing 
very rapidly in recent years. Prior to 1940, it was unusual for carry-
over to exceed 350 million bushels but in 1957 and 1958 it was approxi-
mately 900 million bushels and in 1955 and 1956 it exceeded one billion 
bushels in each year as is true in 1960. Imports of wheat into the U.S. 
have been almost negligible. 
Disappearance describes the purposes for which wheat is used. 
These uses include food, seed, industrial, feed, military procurement, 
exports and shipments. The use which shows most variation from year 
to year is exports. In some years, exports have accounted for over 50 
percent of the wheat produced. Since 1945, it has been unusual if 
exports have not exceeded one-third of the wheat produced. Between 
1930 and 1945, only a relatively small proportion of total wheat pro-
duction was exported. 
Although total population in the U. S. has been increasing, the 
total amount of wheat used for food has been declining gradually. The 
amount used for this purpose amounts to something less than 500 million 
bushels each year and in recent years has accounted for less than one-
half of the wheat produced. 
The specific amounts used for these and other purposes are shown 
in Table 2. This table shows the overall picture concerning total 
supply of wheat in the U.S. together with a general picture of how 
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TABLE 2.-Supply and Disappearance of Wheat, United States, 1930-58 (3) 
Disappearance 
Year Supply 
begin- Continental United States 
ning Carry- Produc- lm- Military 
July over lion ports Total Food Seed Indus- Feed Total procure- Exports Ship- Total 
trial ment ments 
Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil.bp. Mil. bu. Mti. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. 
1930 291 887 (1} 1,178 500 81 
----
178 759 
----
103 3 865 
1931 313 942 (1} 1,254 498 80 
----
180 758 
----
118 3 879 
1932 375 756 Ill 1,132 508 84 ---- 131 723 ---- 28 3 754 
1933 378 552 (1) 930 465 78 (1} 90 633 
----
21 3 657 
~ 
1934 273 526 14 813 475 83 (1} 101 659 
----
6 3 667 
1935 146 628 35 809 490 87 (1} 83 661 
----
4 3 668 
1936 140 630 34 805 493 96 (1) 100 689 
----
10 3 702 
1937 83 874 1 958 489 93 (1} 115 697 
----
104 3 805 
1938 153 920 (1) 1,073 496 74 (1} 142 712 
----
108 3 823 
1939 250 741 (1} 991 489 73 Ill 101 663 ---- 45 3 712 
1940 280 815 4 1,098 489 74 (1] 112 676 
----
34 3 713 
1941 385 942 4 1,330 473 62 2 114 652 16 28 4 700 
1942 631 969 1 1,601 495 65 54 306 921 25 31 5 982 
1943 619 844 136 1,599 477 77 108 511 1,174 63 43 3 1,283 
1944 317 1,060 42 1,419 474 80 83 300 937 150 49 4 1,140 
1945 279 1,108 2 1,389 473 82 21 297 874 91 320 4 1,289 
TABLE 2.-Supply and Disappearance of Wheat, United States, 1930-58 (3)-Continued 
Disappearance 
Year Supply 
begin- Continental United States 
ning Carry- Produc- lm- Military 
July over lion ports Total Food Seed Indus- Feed Total procute- Exports Ship- Total 
trial men! ments 
Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. Mil. bu. 
1946 100 1,152 (1) 1,252 479 87 (1) 178 744 92 328 4 1 '168 
1947 84 1,359 (1) 1,443 484 91 1 179 754 149 340 4 1,247 
1948 196 1,295 2 1,492 471 95 (1) 106 672 182 328 4 1,185 
01 1949 307 1,098 2 1,408 484 81 (1) 111 676 124 179 4 983 
1950 425 1,019 12 1,456 479 88 (1) 109 676 41 335 4 1,056 
1951 400 988 32 1,419 481 88 1 102 672 17 470 4 1,164 
1952 256 1,306 22 1,584 474 89 Ill 82 645 14 315 4 978 
1953 605 1,173 6 1,784 473 69 (1) 77 619 12 216 4 851 
1954 933 984 4 1,921 473 65 (1) 60 598 10 273 4 885 
1955 1,036 935 10 1,981 469 68 1 52 589 8 346 4 947 
1956 1,033 997 8 2,038 467 57 (1) 50 574 9 547 4 1,134 
1957 909 951 11 1,871 473 64 (1) 40 576 8 403 4 991 
1958 881 1,462 
(1) Less than 0.5 million bushels. 
Source: The Wheat Situation. Agricultural Marketmg Service, U.S.D.A., February, 19 59. 
wheat is utilized. Since in this publication the concern is mainly with 
the production of soft red winter wheat, the following section is con-
cerned with this problem. 
SOFT RED WINTER WHEAT PRODUCnON {4) 
In recent years, soft red winter wheat production in the U. S. has 
accounted for between 10 and 20 percent of all wheat production. As 
a percentage of total production, it has declined during the past half 
century. This does not mean, however, that the total production of 
this type of wheat has declined. Actually, total production in the 1950's 
has not been greatly different from the total quantity produced in the 
1910-14 period. 
Between 95 and 100 percent of all wheat produced in Ohio is of the 
soft red winter type. This, together with the fact that Ohio is a rela-
tively important state in the production of wheat, makes it the leading 
producer of soft red winter wheat. Certain other states have a higher 
percentage of their total wheat production in soft red winter but they 
are minor producers of wheat. 
During the period 1944-53, Ohio produced approximately 27 per-
cent of all soft red winter wheat produced in the United States. Ohio 
together with Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Virginia and 
North Carolina produced 80 percent of all of this type of wheat. 
TABLE 3.-Total Wheat Production, Soft Red Winter Wheat Production 
and Soft Red as Percent of Total Wheat Production by Five 
Year 
1910-1914 
1915-1919 
1920-1924 
1925-1929 
1930-1934 
1935-1939 
1940-1944 
1945-1949 
1950-1954 
Year Average, United States, 1910-1954 
Total soft red 
winter wheat Total wheat 
production in the produced in 
United States United Stales 
(in million bu.) (in million bu.) 
206.1 724.4 
243.7 823.8 
204.6 822.0 
155.6 822.9 
176.7 732.5 
204.4 758.6 
158.3 926.0 
203.0 1,202.4 
191.0 1,086.0 
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Soft red winter 
wheat as percent 
of total 
wheat in the 
United States 
28.45 
29.58 
24.89 
18.91 
24.12 
26.94 
17.10 
16.88 
17.59 
An examination of both average wheat yields and acreages of 
wheat harvested in both the U. S. and Ohio is of interest at this point. 
Table 5 indicates that since the late 1920's average wheat yield in the 
U. S. has increased from slightly less than 15 bushels to almost 21.5 
bushels per acre during the period 1954-58. During the same time 
period, average yields in Ohio have increased from approximately 17 
bushels per acre to slightly in excess of 27 bushels per acre. During 
the same period, acreages in both the U. S. and Ohio have increased 
and then because of production controls have declined in recent years. 
TABLE 4.-States Ranked According to Production of Soft Red 
Winter Wheat, United States, 1955 
Percent of Production 
State Total wheat soft red winter af soft red 
production wheat of total winter wheat 
(1,000 bu.) wheat p~oduced (1,000 bu.) 
Ohio 43,993 96 42,233 
Indiana 33,988 96 32,629 
Illinois 51,220 58 29,708 
M1ssouri 49,632 52 25,809 
Pennsylvania 16,536 95 15,709 
North Carolina 7,172 100 7,172 
Virginia 6,502 100 6,502 
Maryland 4,744 100 4,744 
Kentucky 4,020 98 3,940 
Tennessee 3,417 100 3,417 
Michigan 28,914 11 3,181 
South Carolina 2,978 100 2,978 
Minnesota 12,015 16 1,922 
Georgia 1,520 100 1,520 
New Jersey 1,530 98 1,499 
Arkansas 1,404 100 1,404 
Kc111sas 128,385 1 1,284 
Washington 55,240 2 1,105 
Wisconsin 1,298 85 1,103 
Alabama 1,007 100 1,007 
West Virginia 874 100 874 
Delaware 858 99 849 
Texas 13,464 6 808 
Idaho 37,388 374 
Mississippi 286 100 286 
Oregon 21,899 1 219 
New York 10,400 2 208 
New Mexico 1,770 17 
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TABLE 5.-Wheat Yields and Acreages by Five Year Periods, 
U. S. and Ohio, 1924-1958 (5) 
Yield Acreage Production 
(thousand) (thousand bu.) 
Year 
u. s. Ohio u. s. Ohio u. s. Ohio 
1924-28 14.7 17 1 56,075 1,514 824,302 25,889 
1934-38 12 8 19 5 55,429 2,216 709,491 43,212 
1944-48 17.7 24 6 67,870 2,082 I ,201,299 51,217 
1954-58 21.4 27.1 49,234 I ,559 1,064,307 42,248 
In summary, it may be stated that since 1935, total wheat pro-
duction in the U. S. and in Ohio has increased in spite of a decrease in 
the number of acres of wheat harvested. This is due to increased yields 
as a result of using improved varieties of wheat, increased fertilization 
and other technological improvements. 
EFFECT ,OF GOVERNMENT WHEAT PRICE 
PROGRAMS (6 & 7) 
In an attempt to obtain information about this topic, personnel in 
the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology con-
ducted a personal contact survey of Ohio wheat farmers during March 
and April, 1956. Farmers interviewed were flelected by means of a 
randomly selected area sample. A total of 158 farmers representing 
approximately 0.1 percent of the 14 7,032 farmers having wheat allot-
ments in Ohio were interviewed. For purposes of the study, Ohio was 
divided into three districts, Northwest, Central and East. Farmers 
were interviewed in Williams, Mercer and Wyandot Counties in the 
Northwest area. In the Central area, counties included were Lorain, 
Fairfield and Clinton. In the Eastern area, interviews were made in 
Ashtabula, Carroll and Scioto Counties. 
Inasmuch as the flurvey was limited to farmers who were either 
growing wheat in 1956 or who had grown wheat during the previous 
three years and were temporarily not raising wheat, the sample does not 
represent a true cross-section of all Ohio farmers. It does, however, 
represent those farmers who were raising wheat. 
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EFFECT ON PRODUCTION 
Acreage: Wheat growers interviewed were questioned to 
determine to what extent production restrictions were preventing the 
growing of wheat on what was usually considered a normal or preferred 
wheat acreage on their farm. Specifically, each farmer was asked how 
many acres he would seed for the next season's harvest if all production 
restrictions were removed and a price of approximately $1.80 per bushel 
could be expected at harvest time. (The twelve month average price of 
wheat to Ohio farmers in 1955 was $1.91 per bushel and in 1956 was 
$2.04 per bushel.) 
Information in Table 6 indicates that in the Eastern area of the 
state, 67 percent of the farmers would seed the same acreage of wheat 
as in 1956 if allotment~ were discontinued. In the Northwestern area, 
the figure was 20 percent and in the Central area, 23 percent. 
TABLE 6.-Expected Change in Wheat Acreage over 1956 Acreage with 
Production Controls Removed and an Anticipated Market Price of 
$1 .80 per Bushel, 151 Ohio Wheat Producers, 1956 
Area 
Northwest 
Central 
East 
Total and average 
Less 
(Pel.) 
2 
2 
4 
3 
Same 
(Pet.) 
20 
23 
67 
38 
More 
Percent increase over 1956 
0-29 30-59 60-89 90-119 
(Pet.) (Pet.) (Pet) (Pet.) 
27 35 10 6 
21 29 15 10 
6 11 6 6 
17 25 10 7 
Total 
responses 
49 
48 
54 
151 
Average size of allotment in eastern Ohio was 5.3 acres and 21 acres 
in each of the other two areas. Inasmuch as farmers having allotments 
under 15 acres are permitted to over plant their allotment providing 
they do not exceed 15 acres, the present program does not necessitate a 
reduction in wheat acreage. In contrast, farmers with allotments of 
over 15 acres are required to restrict their wheat acreage if they wish to 
take advantage of price support programs. This apparently accounts 
for the fact that in eastern Ohio a smaller proportion of farmers have 
indicated a desire to raise acreages if acreage allotments were discon-
tinued. Many have been free to do this because of the 15 acre limita-
tion. 
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COMPLIANCE WITH ACREAGE ALLOTMENTS 
During the period covered by this study, farmers had voted for a 
program of marketing quotas. This precluded, almost without excep-
tion, any farmer exceeding his allotment if it was more than 15 acres. 
This means that from a practical standpoint, a study concerned with 
allotment compliance must be limited to farmers having allotments of 15 
acres or less. 
Many farm operators in Ohio operate more than one farm. Since 
each farm has its own wheat allotment, many farmers have more than 
one allotment. It is thus possible for an operator to exceed his small 
allotment on each of the farms and at the same time avoid a penalty. A 
total of 68 percent of all farmers interviewed had one or more allotments 
of less than 15 acres. 
Table 7 indicates that of farmers having 1956 allotments of 15 
acres or less, 41 percent complied with the allotment and 56 percent did 
not comply. In the Eastern area of the state, the compliance figure was 
55 percent compared to 36 percent in the Northwest and 28 percent in 
the Central area. 
TABLE 7.-Compliance with Wheat Allotments of Less Than 15 Acres, 
by Areas, 107 rOhio Wheat Producers, 1955 and 1956 
1956 1955 
Compliance 
North- Central East Ohio North- Central East Ohio 
west west 
% % % % % % % % 
Did 36 28 55 41 44 48 64 53 
Did not 64 69 41 56 53 45 36 44 
Both 0 3 4 3 3 7 0 3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
An analysis of Table 8 indicates that only 24 percent of those 
farmers having less than a 15 acre allotment stayed within their allot-
ment because they wished to be eligible to receive a government price 
support loan. A larger proportion, 39 percent, indicated they complied 
with their alloted figure because it happened to fit the rotation planned 
for that particular year. Approximately 9 percent indicated the allot-
ment fitted the size of field which was seeded to wheat. It thus appears 
that compliance with allotments of less than 15 acres is not influenced to 
any great extent by the opportunity to obtain a loan or purchase agree-
ment. 
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TABLE 8.-Reasons for Complying or Not Complying with 
Wheat Allotments of Less Than 15 Acres 
Reosons for complying 
Allotment coincided with rotation 
To obtain advantage of loan 
Allotmenr coincided with field size 
To cooperate with policy makers 
Other 
Don't know 
Total 
Reasons for not complying 
Allotment did not fit rotation 
Did not want to split fields 
Feed wheat, not interested in loan 
Need wheat as a nurse crop 
Allotment too small to bother with loan 
Satisfied with market price 
Total 
Percent 
39 
24 
9 
5 
18 
5 
100 
Percent 
29 
24 
18 
15 
9 
5 
100 
A practical rotation or field size is apparently an important reason 
for lack of compliance of those with allotments of less than 15 acres. 
Twenty-nine percent indicated they would not comply because the 
allotment would not fit their rotation. Likewise, 24 percent said the 
allotment was smaller than the field in which they raised wheat and they 
did not wish to split the field. A total of 15 percent indicated they 
exceeded their allotment in order to seed a legume or a grass in a partic-
ular field. 
Some farmers fed most or all of the wheat grown and gave this 
reason as having no interest in obtaining a loan. The percentage in 
this category amounted to 18. In addition, 9 percent said their allot-
ment was too small to warrant obtaining a loan and 5 percent stated 
they believed the market price was too near the loan price for a loan to 
be worthwhile. 
EFFECT ·ON TOTAL PRODUCTION OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY 
FARMERS WITH ALLOTMENTS OF LESS THAN 15 ACRES 
It was indicated previously that two-thirds of the wheat farmers 
interviewed had one or more allotments of less than 15 acres. Since it 
was possible for this group to exceed their allotment without penalty, an 
analysis of the effects of planted acreages over alloted acreage is of 
interest. 
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A total of 55 percent of those with allotments of less than 15 acres 
exceeded their allotment. The acreage over planted was equal to 
approximately 8 percent of the total 1956 wheat acreage of all farmers 
interviewed. In other words, if none of these farmers had exceeded 
their allotments, total wheat acreage of all growers would have been 
decreased by 8 percent. 
In addition to over planting on the part of some farmers, others 
under planted their alloted acreage. Under planting amounted to 
about one-half the acreage over planted by the group who exceeded 
their allotment. Some would say that the effects of those who over 
plant will be counter-balanced by those who under plant. The results 
of this analysis indicate this is not necessarily true. In this study, 
farmers with allotments of less than 15 acres exceeded their allotments 
as a group by a net of 4 percent. This implies that enforcement of all 
acreage allotments would probably reduce total wheat acreage. 
EFFECT OF PRICE SUPPORTS AND PRODUCTION 
GONTROLS ON WHEAT PRICES 
Farmers in this study were asked what they believed would happen 
to the market price of wheat by harvest time of the next growing season 
if government price supports and production restrictions were removed. 
They were asked to assume that the present government owned surpluses 
would not be dumped on the market. Table 9 shows a summary of 
answers received. It indicates there was a difference of opinion con-
cerning prospective wheat prices at harvest time of the following year. 
A majority believed prices would be lower without a government pro-
gram. Answers differed somewhat according to the type of govern-
ment wheat program preferred, as indicated in Table 10. 
TABLE 9.-Expected Change in Wheat Price by July, 1957, Following 
Removal of Government Price Support Restrictions, 
151 'Ohio Wheat Producers, 1956 
Price change expected 
Higher 
Same 
Lower 
Don't know 
Total 
22 
Percent 
4 
15 
69 
12 
100 
Information in Table 10 indicates that the most pessimism was 
shown by the group who preferred a program of marketing quotas 
accompanied by a relatively high price support program ( $1.80). The 
next most pessimistic group was the group favoring allotments with a 
relatively lower support price ( $1.20) and the least pessimistic group 
was the one favoring no government program. Most farmers did not 
expect any program to raise prices. 
TABLE 1 0.-Anticipated Effect of Removal of Government Price Supports 
and Production Controls on Wheat Prices, by Type of Government 
Wheat Program Preferred, 138 Ohio Wheat Producers, 1956 
Anticipated effect 
Program preferred Total 
Higher Same Lower Don't responses 
know 
% % % % 
Quotas, $1.80 support price 3 3 89 5 40 
Allotments, $1.20 support price 0 9 82 9 11 
No government program 6 20 57 17 87 
Total 138 
EXTENT 10F FARrMER PARTICIPAnON IN NON-RECOURSE LOAN 
AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT PROGRAMS 
Although all farmers who did not exceed their acreage allotments 
were eligible to receive loans or purchase agreements, only 17 percent of 
the entire group obtained them. Farmers in the Northwest and Central 
area of the state accounted for most of the loans and purchase agree-
ments. Only a relatively few in the Eastern area of the state availed 
themselves of the opportunity to obtain a guaranteed price. Average 
size of allotments for those who obtained a non-recourse loan or pur-
chase agreement on their wheat was 34.8 acres and the average for those 
who did not obtain a loan was 15.2 acres. 
Ohio wheat prices following wheat harvest in 1955 averaged $1.75 
per bushel in July, $1.71 in August and $1.75 in September. The 
approximate net loan received for wheat stored on the farm was $2.12 
per bushel. Following the harvest period, wheat prices on the open 
market continued to advance until April when the average price was 
$2.15, a figure slightly higher than the one which could have been 
obtained by a non-recourse loan. It should be pointed out, however, 
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TABLE 11.-Producers Obtaining a Loan or Purchase Agreement on 1955 
Wheat Crop by Geographic Areas, 150 Ohio Wheat Producers, 1956 
Obtai·ned a loan 
Area of state Number responses 
Yes No 
% % 
Northwest 28 72 47 
Central 22 74 49 
East 2 98 54 
Total and average 17 83 150 
that the final date for 1955 wheat to be placed under loan was January 
31. Ohio wheat prices averaged $1.94 for the month of January, a 
figure $ .18 less than the loan rate. 
Since there seemingly would have been a price advantage for tho~e 
who obtained a non-recourse loan and since so few farmers obtained 
such a loan, a question was asked concerning reasons for not obtaining 
a loan or purchase agreement. A summary of answers about th1s ques-
tion is summarized in Table 12. 
TABLE 12.-Reasons for Not Obtaining Government Non-recourse 
Loan or Purchase Agreement on 1955 Wheat Crop, 
68 Eligible Ohio Wheat Producers, 1956 
Reason 
Feed wheat, not mterested m loan 
Bother ' of gettmg loan 
Dosapprove of loan program 
Don't ' need ' loan 
Satosfled woth market pnce 
No convenoent storage avadable 
Custom-have never taken Joan 
Don't know 
Total 
Percent 
23 
21 
13 
15 
5 
14 
8 
100 
Table 12 shows that 23 percent of the wheat growers interviewed 
who were eligible for a loan did not obtain one because they fed most or 
all of the wheat grown. The 21 percent who said it was too much 
bother objected to the "red tape" and necessity of storing and handling 
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the wheat according to government directives. Thirteen percent did 
not approve of the government loan program. The 15 percent who said 
they did not "need" the loan implied they would probably obtain a loan 
if their financial situation required the additional income obtainable by 
means of a loan. Five percent were satisfied with the market price and 
believed that a loan would not be worth the administrative and storage 
requirements. 
The 8 percent who &aid they had "never taken a loan" have prob-
ably not done &o because they either objected to the program, disliked 
the procedure necessary to obtain a loan or didn't feel it returned suffi-
cient additional returns over the market price. It is difficult to 
determine the basic reasoning of this group who has, as a custom, 
refrained from obtaining loans. Fourteen percent indicated that the 
lack of convenient storage either on the farm or in custom storage was 
the primary reason for not getting a loan. However, when members of 
thi-; group were later asked if more wheat would have been placed under 
loan if adequate storage were available, one-third of the group gave a 
negative reply. Six percent of all wheat growers interviewed indicated 
plans to acquire additional <.mall grain &torage on the farm within the 
next two or three years. 
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS ON FAIM INCOME 
Increased farm income has been one objective of all former govern-
ment farm price support programs. An analysis of farmer opinion con-
cerning the effects of such programs is of interest. 
Table 13 indicates that 30 percent of the wheat growers inter-
viewed believed the government program had increased their income 
during the previous two years. Slightly more than one-fourth believed 
their incomes had been reduced and almost one-fifth believed their 
incomes had not been changed by government programs. 
TABLE 13.-Effect of Government Programs of Past Three Years on 
Personal Farm Income, 152 Ohio Wheat Producers, 1956 
Effect of government programs 
Has reduced mcome 
Ltttle or no effect 
Has mcreased mcome 
Don t know 
Total 
25 
Percent of farmers 
26 
19 
30 
25 
100 
An analysis of these opinions was made concerning effect of govern-
ment programs on farm income by tenure, size of farm and age and 
membership in various farm organizations, but there was no significant 
difference within any of these groups. 
TYPE OF PROGRAM PREFERRED 
Wheat growers interviewed were questioned about their personal 
preferences regarding alternative programs through which the govern-
ment would or would not support wheat prices and control wheat pro-
duction. Further inquiry was designed to determine upon what cri-
teria, economic or otherwise, preferences were based. 
Three possible types of programs were offered by the interviewer 
for the respondent's consideration. They were: ( 1) forced compliance 
of acreage allotments through the use of marketing quotas, with the 
price of wheat supported at a level where the farmer would receive a 
nee of $1.80 per bushel; (2) without marketing quotas but with acre-
age allotments and with a net support price of $1.20 and (3) no govern-
ment program with market price determined by "supply and demand." 
To the wheat grower, the possible price supporting benefits vary 
inversely with the degree of production controls imposed. The higher 
price supports require more production restrictions. 
TABLE 14.-Farmer's Choice of Three Alternative Government Wheat 
Programs, 148 Ohio Wheat Producers, March-April, 1956 
Government progrom preferred 
Marketmg quotas, acreage allotments, net support pnce 
$1.80 per bushel 
Acreage allotments, net support price $1.20 per bushel 
No government program-price determined by "supply 
and demand" 
Don't know 
Iota I 
Percent of formers 
28 
7 
59 
6 
100 
In the analysis of this question in Table 14, 59 percent of the wheat 
growers interviewed stated a preference for a wheat market free of 
federal government price supporting and production limiting activities. 
Twenty-eight percent favored a program almost identical to the one in 
1 Net support price is that received by the producer after administra-
tion costs of loan have been deducted. 
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effect at the time of the survey. This included marketing quotas and 
support prices at a relatively high level. Seven percent expressed a 
preference for a program of unenforced acreage allotments (except loss 
of the privilege of obtaining a loan or purchase agreement) and a net 
support price of $1.20 per bu~hel. 
Table 15 indicates the possible effect of price upon wheat grower's 
willingness to accept or reject marketing quotas. 
TABLE 15.-Role of Wheat Price in Determining Type of Government 
Wheat Program Preferred, 114 rQhio 'Wheat Producers, 
March-April, 1956 
Effect of price on decision 
Total 
Type of government program preferred No Decision Don't responses 
effect affected know 
by price Number 
% % % 
Quotas, allotments, $1.80 support 5 81 14 37 
Allotments, $1.20 support pnce 16 34 50 6 
No product1on restnct1ons or pnce supports 64 22 14 71 
Average and total 42 42 16 114 
The data in Table 15 were obtained by asking those expressing a 
preference for a non-quota type of program what the market price of 
wheat would have to be for them to be willing to accept quotas. Sixty-
four percent indicated they would not be in favor of marketing quotas 
regardless of how low prices might be. Twenty-two percent said they 
would favor quotas if the price declined below some minimum desired 
level. The average of the prices stated at which quotas would be 
acceptable to this group of farmers was $1.60 per bushel. 
Producers indicating a preference for a program which included 
allotments and quotas were asked what the wheat price would have to 
be before they would favor eliminating marketing quotas. The average 
given by 81 percent of this group who stated a price was $1.86. It 
should be noted that this price is compared to an average open market 
price of $1.90 (Table 16) per bushel for the period from the beginning 
of wheat harvest in July, 1955, to the time of the survey. 
Results of this survey indicate there is a difference in age of the 
groups favoring the different government programs. Table 17 shows 
that farmers preferring a government wheat program of quotas, acreage 
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TABLE 16.-Average Price Received by Farmers for All Grades of 
Wheat Marketed, Ohio, by Months, July, 1955-April, 1956 
Yeat Month Price per bushel 
1955 July $1.79 
August 1.71 
September 1.75 
October 1.83 
November 1.86 
December 1.94 
1956 January 1.94 
February 1.98 
March 2.02 
April 2.15 
Average-! 0 months 1.90 
allotments and a net support price of about $1.80 had an average age of 
46.2 years and were younger than those favoring no government pro-
gram, whose average age was 50.9 years. The 8.4 percent of the 131 
selecting a program who chose a system of acreage allotments and a net 
support price of $1.20 but without quotas, were considerably younger 
with an average age of 35.5 years. The average age for the entire group 
stating a preference for a specific program was 48.2 years. 
TABLE 17.-Preference for Government Wheat Programs, Average 
Age, 131 Ohio Wheat Producers, 1956 
Program Average age Total responses 
Quotas, $1 .80 46.2 years 40 
Allotments, $ 1.20 35.5 years 11 
No government program 50.9 years 80 
Total and average 48.2 years 131 
Although the age difference between the first two groups in Table 
17 is not great, it is of some interest. It indicates that the older farmers 
are more likely to favor no government assistance. Most might agree 
that the older farmers are somewhat more independent financially inas-
much as they have had a longer time to pay off indebtedness, educate 
their families and accumulate Sfl.Vings. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF SOFT RED WINTER WHEAT (8) 
Generally there are four groups interested in the characteristics of 
wheat. These groups are: (1) thefarmer, (2) theexporter, (3) the 
miller and ( 4) the consumer. Each uses wheat for a different purpose 
and because of this fact each judges quality on a slightly different basis. 
The farmer is interested in a variety of wheat which is adaptable 
to the weather and soil conditions characteristic of his farm. He judges 
quality of a class of wheat primarily on the basis of yield. Maximum 
yields of soft red winter wheat are obtained in geographic areas where 
rainfall exceeds 30 inches annually and soils are high in organic matter 
and respond well to heavy applications of fertilizer. As a result, this 
type of wheat is grown in the eastern portion of the United States. It 
is not adapted to areas having low rainfall and severe winters because it 
is not exceptionally resistant to drought and it is somewhat susceptible 
to winter killing. Soft red winter wheat has a rather stiff straw and 
this characteristic tends to prevent lodging. 
The exporter evaluates wheat in terms of its acceptability and 
intended use by the importing country. Wheat to be exported must be 
comparable to the wheat grown in the importing country or it must fill 
some other need which wheat grown in the importing country cannot 
fill. Most of the soft red winter wheat exports since World War II have 
gone to European countries. Northwestern European countries were 
important producers of this class of wheat in the prewar years, but 
shortages in that area of the world have increased the demand for U. S. 
soft red winter wheat since the war. 
The miller is interested in the basic characteristics and the chemi-
cal composition of the wheat kernel. Basically, he wants a wheat that 
will mill easily and provide the relative proportion of protein and starch 
that the baker demands. Wheat flour to be used for making bread 
requires both high protein content and a high quality of protein. If 
the intended use for flour is other than bread, a lower content of protein 
is usually desired. Soft wheats usually have a lower protein content 
and this makes them desirable for flours used for other than bread bak-
ing purposes. 
The consumer, perhaps without realizing it, is influential in shap-
ing the actions of the three groups mentioned in the preceding para-
graphs. Consumers may know little about the methods of production 
and baking but their tastes must be satisfied if they are to buy a specific 
product. Thus, the baker must adapt his methods and products to thf' 
tastes of consumers. 
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It is possible to divide the baker's methods into two general classes 
based on the type of leavening agent used. In one case, the baker uses 
a flour of relatively high protein content to obtain a product in which 
yeast is used as the leavening agent. In the second case, the baker uses 
a lower protein flour to obtain a product in which baking powder is the 
leavening agent. The bulk of yeast leavened goods are bread, bread 
type rolls and some pastries. For these products the baker uses a high 
protein wheat to obtain a high quality product. In terms of classes of 
wheat, this is either hard red spring or hard red winter. 
The quality and quantity of protein in these wheats is such that gas 
retention during the leavening process is maximized. When gas reten-
tion is maximized, the cell walls are spread very thin. This maximizes 
the surface area in the loaf and gives a fine textured loaf of the desired 
volume. The protein in the flour also concerns the rate of water absorp-
tion in the dough. A high quality protein will give a high rate of water 
absorption and this characteristic is much desired because loaf volume is 
increased. 
Soft wheat flours do not rate very well in either volume or texture 
of the loaf produced. In addition, the water absorption rate and pro-
tein content of soft red winter wheat is slightly lower than that of the 
hard winter classes. These are the major factors which give soft red 
winter wheat inferior bread baking qualities. 
Although the soft red winter wheats are not well adapted to bread 
making, they are superior for use in baking products which require 
baking powder as a leavening agent. Products which use chemical 
leavening are crackers, cakes, pre-mixed flour, doughnuts, ice cream 
cones, self-rising flours, cookies, biscuits, pretzels and some pastry goods. 
Soft red winter wheat is used in all of these products to some extent, 
however, its primary use is in crackers, cakes, pre-mixed flours, dough-
nuts, self-rising flours and pastries. Some soft white wheats are used in 
the production of cookies and breakfast cereals. Some of this class is 
also used in other chemically leavened products because it is a close 
substitute for soft red winter wheat. 
Soft red winter wheat flour is especially well adapted for use in 
bakery products because the gluten is delicate and readily forms gas 
cells with very thin and tender walls. Usually the flour has less color-
ing matter and contains smaller proportions of bran than the hard 
wheats. This characteristic makes the flour very white. It is the 
delicate texture and light color which consumers desire in a pastry 
prodw:;t. 
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DEMAND FOR ALL CLASSES OF WHEAT AND FOR SOFT 
RED WINTER WHEAT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION (8) 
Basic data used for this part of the study were obtained from food 
consumption surveys conducted by the U.S.D.A. in 1942 and 1955. 
Data obtained in these two surveys included information concerning 
consumption of flour products during a given week in the spring of both 
years. From these data, it was possible to calculate the flour content of 
the products consumed. In making these calculations, it was assumed 
that the flour content in bread and in other bread type products 
amounted to 64 percent of total weight. A 50 percent content in other 
baked goods and 100 percent of all-purpose flours and prepared flour 
mixes was assumed. 
The next steps were to expand the weekly household consumption 
to an annual basis and to estimate the amount of baked goods eaten 
away from home. Became data for consumption of food away from 
home are not readily available, estimates were made on the basis that 
flour products commrned away from home were consumed in the same 
proportion as horne consumption. The percentage of food consumed 
away from home was then calculated as 9.8 percent of home consump-
tion. This is the figure which represents the cost of food eaten away 
from home. 
The next step involved was to convert household consumption of 
flour to a per capita basis. This gave per capita consumption by type 
of flour product. This total for these products then equaled the total 
consumption of flour products. To obtain per capita consumption of 
soft red winter wheat, it was necessary to obtain information on the 
percentage of soft red winter wheat used in the various flour products. 
These percentages were then applied to the flour consumption by 
product to obtain per capita consumption of soft red winter wheat. 
In order to obtain data concerning per capita consumption in the 
future, a linear trend was fitted to the two levels of consumption (those 
in 1942 and 1955). The expected level of per capita consumption was 
then expanded by the Bureau of Census population estimates to obtain 
the level of per capita consumption of soft red winter wheat and all 
wheat in 1965. 
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PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF ALL WHEAT FLOUR PRODUCTS 
In the two major household food consumption studies mentioned 
previously, flour and pastry products were divided into eight groups. 
Levels of per capita consumption for each product group and for total 
per capita consumption are shown in Table 18 along with projected 
consumption per capita in 1965. Information in Table 19 indicates 
that per capita consumption of flour decreased from 155 pounds in 1942 
to approximately 127 pounds in 1955. This was a total decrease of 28 
pounds and an annual decrease of slightly more than two pounds. Pro-
jection of the trend at this rate of decline indicates that per capita con-
sumption of all wheat flour will be approximately 105 pounds in 1965. 
The total decrease would thus amount to approximately 51 pounds per 
capita over the 23 year period. 
TABLE 18.-Per Capita Consumption of Wheat Flour and Baked Goods in 
1942 and 1955 and Projected per Capita Consumption in 1965 
(Pounds of flour) 
P•oduct 1942 1955 1965 
Flour other than mixes 82.04 44.27 15.22 
Prepared flour mtxes .33 9.99 17.42 
Breakfast cereals 2.76 2.25 1.86 
Macaroni and spaghetti 3.77 3.50 3.29 
Bread 52.90 50.17 48.07 
Crackers 3.85 3.83 3.81 
Cakes 4.10 3.00 2.15 
Other baked goods* 5.61 9.82 13.06 
Total 155.36 126.83 104.88 
*Includes doughnuts, sweet buns, rolls, cookies, biscuits, coffee cake, and other pastries. 
Table 19 indicates that only two of the eight product groups were 
consumed in larger quantities in 1955 than in 1942. These two product 
groups are flour mixes and other baked goods. 
Per capita consumption of prepared flour mixes increased from less 
than one pound in 1942 to 10 pounds in 1955. Projection of this trend 
indicates that per capita consumption of prepared flour mixes will be 
more than 17 pounds by 1965. As a percentage of total consumption, 
prepared flour mixes will have increased from .2 percent in 1942 to 16.6 
percent in 1965. (The above figures are shown in Table 19.) 
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TABLE 19 .-Percentage Distribution of the per Capita Consumption of 
Flour by Product, United States, 1942, 1955 and 1965 
Product 1942 1955 1965 
Flour 52.81 34.90 14.52 
Prepared floc1r mixes .20 7.88 16.61 
Breakfast cereals 1.78 1.77 1.77 
Macaronia and spaghetti 2.43 2.76 3.14 
Bread 34.05 39.56 45.83 
Crackers 2.48 3.02 3.63 
Cakes 2.64 2.37 2.05 
Other baked goods* 3.61 7.74 12.45 
rota I 100.00 100.00 100.00 
*Includes doughnuts, cookies, sweet buns, rolls, biscuits, coffee cake, and other pastries. 
Between 1942 and 1955, consumption of other baked goods 
increased from 5.6 pounds to 9.8 pounds. Projection of the trend indi-
cates that per capita consumption of this product group will exceed 13 
pounds by 1965. During the same period, this group of other baked 
goods will have increased from 3.6 to 12.5 percent of total flour con-
sumption. 
As mentioned previously, per capita consumption of all products 
except prepared flour mixes and other baked goods decreased between 
1942 and 1955. The consumption of flour other than mixes decreased 
considerably more than any of the other products. It decreased from 
82 pounds to slightly more than 44 pounds. Projection of this trend 
indicates that per capita consumption of flour other than mixes will 
decrease to approximately 15 pounds by 1965. This means that four-
teen and one-half percent of all flour consumption would be in this 
product group in 1965 as compared to 52.8 percent in 1942. 
The decline in per capita consumption of the other product groups 
has not been as significant as that of all-purpose flours. It is true, how-
ever, that changes in per capita consumption which have occurred and 
which will likely occur, change the relative importance of the various 
products. For example, the total decrease in per capita consumption 
of bread over the entire period will be approximately 4.8 pounds but 
bread will account for almost 46 percent of total consumption as com-
pared to 34 percent in 1942. 
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PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF SOFT RED WINTER 
WHEAT PRODUCTS 
Per capita consumption of soft red winter wheat has been cal-
culated from data in Table 18. In making these calculations the per-
centage of soft red winter wheat in each product group in 1955 was 
applied to the consumption data in 1965. Percentages were based on 
the type of leavening agent used and on information obtained by talking 
with bakers and millers working with soft red winter wheat. 
It appears that consumption of soft red winter wheat is increasing 
rather than decreasing as is the case with per capita consumption of all 
wheat. Information in the following table indicates that per capita 
con~umption of this type of wheat will be approximately 30 pound~ per 
person in 1965 as compared with slightly less than 25 pounds per person 
in 1955. According to these projections, per capita consumption of 
self-rising flours and cakes will decline between 1955 and 1965. Con-
trariwise, per capita consumption of 5oft red winter wheat flour used in 
prepared flour mixes will increase considerably during the period. The 
indicated increase amounts to more than 7 pounds per person and 
accounts for more than the total incrca~>e indicated for all soft red 
winter wheat flour. 
TABLE 20.-Per Capita Consumption of Soft Red Winter Wheat 
Flour in 1955 by Product and Projection of the per 
Capita Consumption to 1965 
Product 1955 
(lbs.) 
Self-nsrng flours 4.61 
Prepared flour mrxes 9 99 
Crackers 2.30 
Cakes 3.00 
Other baked goods 4.91 
Total 24.81 
1965 
(lbs.) 
1.59 
17 42 
2.29 
2.15 
6 53 
29.98 
The percentage distribution of the products comprising per capita 
consumption of soft red winter wheat shown in Table 21 indicates the 
changing relative importance of the various products. 
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TABLE 21.-Percentage Distribution of the per Capita Consumption of 
Soft Red Winter Wheat by Product, United States, 1955 and 1965 
Product 1955 1965 
Self-rising flours 18 58 5.30 
Prepared flour mrxes 40 27 58.11 
Crackers 0.?7 7.64 
Cakes 12 09 7.17 
Other baked goods 19.79 21.78 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Projected data in the above table shows that flour mixes accounted 
for about 40 percent of the per capita consumption of soft red winter 
wheat flour in 1955. This percentage is expected to increase to 58 per-
cent by 1965. Self-rising flour shows the greatest decrease in per capita 
consumption during the period. It will likely decline from slightly 
more than 18 percent in 1955 to approximately 5 percent in 1965. 
TOTAL OONSUrMPTION OF SOFT RED WINTER WHEAT 
AND ALL WHEAT 
The previous discussion has been concerned with per capita con-
sumption of soft red winter wheat and of all wheat for human food. In 
this section we examine prospective total consumption. To do this we 
need to make certain estimates concerning possible future population 
growth. 
Information in the following tables was derived on the basis of 
prospective per capita consumption of flour and projected population 
growth. Both minimum and maximum population estimates were used 
to derive the range into which total consumption will likely fall. Total 
flour consumption was converted to bushels of wheat by using the mill-
ing ratio of 2.36 bushels of wheat per 100 pounds of flour. 
Data in Tables 22 and 23 indicate that total consumption of all 
wheat will decline during the next 10 years. Even with expected 
maximum rates of population growth, population will not increase 
enough to offset the decrease in per capita consumption. If population 
should increase at the maximum rate, total consumption of all wheat 
would decrease to 476,706,000 bushels, giving a total decrease of 
17,834,000 bushels. On the other hand, if the minimum rate of popu-
lation growth is used the consumption of all wheat will decrease to 
458,796,000 bushels by 1965. This is a total decrease of 35,744,000 
bushels from the 1955 figure. 
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TABLE 22.-Consumption of Soft Red Winter Wheat and All Wheat 
in 1955 and Est'imated Consumption in 1965 Assuming 
a Minimum Rate of Population Growth 
All wheat Soft red winter wheat 
Population and consumption 
1955 1965 1955 1965 
Per cap1ta flour consumption, lbs. 126.81 104 88 24 81 29.98 
Populat1on (000) 165,248 185,359 165,248 185,359 
Total flour consumpt1on (000 of cwts.) 209,551 194,405 40,998 55,571 
Bushels of wheat consumed (000) 494,540 458,796 96,755 131 '148 
Total consumption data for soft red winter wheat indicate a situa-
tion which is quite di!Ierent. At expected minimum rates of population 
growth, total consumption of soft red winter wheat will be increased to 
131,148,000 bushels by 1965 compared with 96,755,000 bushels in 1955. 
This is a total increase of more than 34,000,000 bushels in the 10 year 
period. At a maximum rate of population growth 136,266,000 bushels 
will be consumed in 1965. This is a total increase of more than 
39,000,000 bushels during the period. 
By 1965, soft red winter wheat consumption will account for 
approximately 28.5 percent of total wheat consumption as compared to 
approximately 20 percent in 1955. 
TABLE 23.-Consumption of Soft Red Winter Wheat and All Wheat 
in 1955 and Estimated Consumption in 1965 Assuming 
a Maximum Rate of Population Growth 
All wheat Soft red winter wheat 
Population and oonsumption 
1955 1965 1955 1965 
Per cap1ta flour consumpt1on, lbs. 126.81 104 88 24.81 29.98 
Population {000) 165,248 192,595 165,248 192,595 
Total flour consumption {000 of cwts.) 209,551 201,994 40,998 57,740 
Bushels of wheat consumed (000) 494,450 476,706 96,755 136,266 
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Changes in the consumption patterns of wheat between 1942 and 
1955 were associated with changes in levels of real income. During 
this period, levels of income increased and as incomes increased, con-
sumers increased purchases of the more expensive food items and 
decreased purchases of the less expensive items. Thus, they purchase 
less bread and all-purpose flour and more prepared flour mixes and 
similar products as incomes rise. Wheat consumption figures projected 
to 1965 assume incomes will increase during the period at about the 
same rate as between 1942 and 1955. In the long run, many authori-
ties would probably expect incomes to increase at a faster rate than was 
true for the 1942-1955 period. 
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